

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

DRC-01 /164 W

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R 172036Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 183

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION TO NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T VIENNA 8583

FROM US REP MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND US DEPREP HAD INFORMAL DISCUSSION  
FOCUSED ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WITH UK REP (ROSE) AND DEPREP  
ON OCTOBER 16 AND US REP HAD FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH UK REP ON  
OCTOBER 17. ROSE INDICATED UK WOULD NOT HAVE FIRM POSITION ON PRE-  
REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS UNTIL NAC REVIEW COMPLETED. UK REPS ALSO  
EXPRESSED CONCERN US WOULD NOT INSIST ON ADEQUATE QUID PRO QUO FROM  
SOVIETS AND WISHED TO PROCEED TOO FAST WITH MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.  
END SUMMARY.

1. ROSE AND GOODALL MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON OCTOBER 16:

(A) THEY EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT US FELT ITSELF UNDER  
HEAVY CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO GET AN AGREEMENT AND ACCORDINGLY  
WOULD ACCEPT A FORM OF AGREEMENT WHICH CONTAINED ONLY INADEQUATE  
COMMITMENTS FROM THE SOVIETS. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY VIEWED  
THE BERLIN QUADRIPARTITE ACCORDS AS BEING OF THIS UNFAVORABLE  
CHARACTER.

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(B) ROSE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE MIDEAST WAR MIGHT NOT REDUCE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR US UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL AND ACCORDINGLY PERMIT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED AT SLOW, DELIBERATE PACE THUS PRODUCING AGREEMENT MORE FAVORABLE TO THE WEST.

(C) IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTIONS THAT UK AND FRG SEEK TO COMPROMISE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND COME TO AGREEMENT ON DESIRABLE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS, UK REPS SAID THAT THIS WOULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME IN VIEW OF LACK OF ADEQUATE STUDY TO DATE BY EITHER UK OR NATO AND INDICATED THAT UK DECISION WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT NAC REVIEW AND DETERMINATION.

(D) UK REPS STATED STRONG OPPOSITION TO ANY CONSTRAINT WHICH LIMITED MOVEMENTS ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL ADVERSE IMPACT ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY.

(E) IN DISCUSSION OF PARA 34 OF US OPENING STATEMENT, ROSE INDICATED THAT US POSITION THAT IT COULD NOT IGNORE MAJOR CHANGES IN FORCES WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENT STANDING ALONE TO PREVENT SOVIET FORCE INCREASES DURING NEGOTIATIONS. HE INDICATED THAT UK WANTED A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT FROM THE SOVIETS.

2. US REPS MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THEY POINTED OUT SIGNIFICANT FAVORABLE SUBSTANTIVE RESULT OF BERLIN ACCORDS AND STATED THAT IN MBFR US WOULD INSIST ON SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET COMMITMENTS.

(B) THEY GAVE AS THEIR VIEW THAT IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT MIDEAST WAR WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL AND SAID THAT ONLY 100 PERCENT OFFSET TO MILITARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COSTS COULD REDUCE PRESSURE.

(C) WITH RESPECT TO SUGGESTION OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO MAKE NO MAJOR FORCE CHANGES, US REPS EXPRESSED VIEW THAT CLEAR UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING BY US SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO TRY TO BRING SOVIETS TO MAKE EXPRESS PARALLEL COMMITMENT.

3. AT OCTOBER 17 MEETING, ROSE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS--:

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(A) UK DOES NOT INSIST ON PRE-REDUCTION FLA BU WOULD PROBABLY BE SATISFIED WITH SOVIET RESPONSE TO US OPENING STATEMENT INDICATING SOVIETS ASSENTED TO US CONCEPT OF NO MAJOR CHANGES DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

(B) ROSE NOT FAMILIAR WITH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UK AND FRG WITH RESPECT TO PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

(C) ROSE EXPECTS NAC TO DETERMINE ALL POLICY MATTERS WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS AND THINKS THAT NAC INTERPRETS ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS AS REQUIRING THIS PROCEDURE.

(D) UNCERTAIN STATUS OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND RELATIONSHIP WITH NAC WILL REQUIRE NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED ON SLOWER SCHEDULE THAN US CONTEMPLATES.

(E) AUTUMN OF 1974 IS EARLIEST UK EXPECTS NEGOTIATIONS TO SHOW PROGRESS.

4. US REP REITERATED VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF FRG AND UK COULD COME TO AGREEMENT ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND THAT AGREED ALLIED POSITION IS NEEDED BY TIME ALLIED PRESENTATION OF THEMES COMMENCES. HE ADDED THAT UNITED STATES OPPOSED BROADENING AREA OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS LEST THE AREA FOR WHICH REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE NEGOTIATED BY REOPENED AS AN ISSUE.

5. UK REP SAID THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT TABLE THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL UNTIL FEBRUARY. US REP STATED THAT HE THOUGHT US WOULD NEED TO SHOW ITS CONGRESS SOME PROGRESS BY LATE SPRING 1974 AND THAT TO PERMIT THIS ALLIED PROPOSAL SHOULD BE TABLED IN TIME TO ALLOW SUB-STANTIAL PERIOD FOR SOVIET STONEWALLING PRIOR TO SPRING. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE ALLIES TABLE A PROPOSAL CONSIDERABLY PRIOR TO FEBRUARY. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
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